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Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) is immune to all security loopholes
on detection. Previous experiments on MDI-QKD required spatially separated signal lasers and complicated
stabilization systems. In this paper, we perform a proof-of-principle experimental demonstration of plug-and-
play MDI-QKD over an asymmetric channel setting with a single signal laser in which the whole system is
automatically stabilized in spectrum, polarization, arrival time, and phase reference. Both the signal laser and
the single-photon detectors are in the possession of a common server. A passive timing-calibration technique is
applied to ensure the precise and stable overlap of signal pulses. The results pave the way for the realization of a
quantum network in which the users only need the encoding devices.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2] allows the two
legitimate parties, Alice and Bob, to share an information-
theoretical secure key guaranteed by the laws of quantum
physics. Despite tremendous experimental effort being made
in the field [3–5], an important problem in current QKD
implementations is the gap between its theory and its practice
[6–10]. To close this gap, three main approaches have been
developed. The first one is the security patch [11,12], but
it is difficult to include all potential and unnoticed security
loopholes. The second one is the device-independent QKD
(DI-QKD) [13–15]. This approach is still challenging with
current technology since it requires a loophole-free Bell test.
The third approach is the measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) [16], which removes all detection-related
security loopholes. Such a loophole is arguably the most
important issue identified in conventional QKD implemen-
tations [7–10]. Therefore, MDI-QKD is of great impor-
tance to promote the security of practical QKD systems.
In addition, with current technology, MDI-QKD is suit-
able for both long-distance communication and metropolitan
networks [17,18].
Achievements of MDI-QKD have been made in both
theory [19–23] and experiment [17,24–30]. The experimental
demonstration of MDI-QKD requires the indistinguishability
of photons from Alice and Bob, mainly in three dimensions:
spectrum, polarization, and timing. To solve this challenge, the
active stabilization systems were normally utilized in previous
experiments. For example, the feedback temperature-control
units for the distributed feedback lasers [25,28] or frequency-
locked lasers [24,27] were employed to match the spectral
mode. The feedback temporal-control system was utilized to
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calibrate the arrival time of the signals [24,28]. The phase-
(or polarization-) stabilization system was always essential
in the time-bin phase-encoding (or polarization-encoding)
scheme. Recently, many proposals and demonstrations have
been made to mitigate the complexity in the implementations
of MDI-QKD [18,31–33]. In particular, a promising scheme is
the plug-and-play MDI-QKD [18,33], which greatly reduces
the experimental complexity of mode matching and reference-
frame alignment. But, since the signal laser source and single-
photon detectors (SPDs) are in the charge of an untrusted
server, plug-and-play MDI-QKD is vulnerable to source
attacks [6,7,9]. Fortunately, with the security analysis reported
in Ref. [18], plug-and-play MDI-QKD can be implemented
even with a single untrusted source. However, so far, an
experimental demonstration of plug-and-play MDI-QKD is
still missing, except for a proof-of-concept test [33] with
polarization encoding over a free space channel within a few
meters. This proof-of-concept test is not in accordance with the
plug-and-play architecture and still needs some stabilization
measures.
In this paper, we report a demonstration of plug-and-play
MDI-QKD using time-bin phase encoding over an asymmetric
channel setting in which the two channels from Alice and
Bob to Charlie are 14- and 22-km standard optical fibers.
The encoding optical pulses of Alice and Bob come from
a single homemade laser held by Charlie, which ensures
that no mismatch exists in both pulse waveform and optical
spectrum. Thanks to the plug-and-play architecture [34], the
polarization state is automatically calibrated and stabilized.
The encoding optical pulses of Alice and Bob share the
same reference frame. In the asymmetric channel setting, an
experimental challenge is how to precisely match the timing
of pulses, returned from Alice and Bob, respectively, over
two mismatched channels. We developed a passive timing-
calibration method by using two synchronization lasers (oper-
ating at 1310 nm) and multiplexing them with the signal laser
(operating at 1550 nm) via wavelength division multiplexing
(WDM).
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II. EXPERIMENT
The experimental setup of plug-and-play MDI-QKD
is illustrated in Fig. 1(a). We implement the time-bin
phase-encoding scheme [17,24,25,28,29]. The signal laser
source (1550 nm) and detectors are held by a common server
(Charlie). The signal laser is internally modulated into a pulse
train with a width of 2 ns (FWHM) at a 1-MHz repetition
rate. An AMZI is utilized to separate the pulses into two time
bins with a 20-ns time delay. Alice and Bob only have the
modulation devices including PMs and AMs for encoding.
The key bit in the X basis is encoded into the relative phase
0 or π by PM1, whereas the key bit in the Z basis is encoded
into the time bin 0 or 1 by AM1. Figure 1(b) illustrates the
structure of AM1 [35]. AM1 contains a normal PBS, a PBS
with a 45◦ rotation from the optical axis, a phase modulator,
and a Faraday rotator in which different optical intensities at
the output port of the PBS are realized by modulating the
relative phase between the long path (L) and the short path
(S) [36]. PM2 is used for the active phase randomization, and
AM2 is used to implement the decoy states.
The signal pulses travel through a single-mode fiber spool
of 14 km (22 km) from Charlie to Alice (Bob). After being
modulated by Alice and Bob, the pulses return to Charlie to
interfere at the BS. A coincident detection at alternative time
bins indicates a successful BSM. At the measurement site,
the BSM is implemented with a polarization-maintaining BS
and two commercial InGaAs SPDs (ID201) with an efficiency
of 10% and a gate width of 2.5 ns. The dead time is 10 μs
with a dark count rate of 6 × 10−6 per gate. A Bell state
(singlet) is successfully postselected when a coincidence of
two SPDs happens at alternative time bins. After Charlie
announces the result of the partial BSM, Alice and Bob shift the
raw key.
The crucial aspect in the experiment is the indistinguisha-
bility of signal pulses from Alice and Bob, mainly in three
dimensions: spectrum, polarization, and timing. Errors would
occur if any mismatch exists in these dimensions. In our
system, Alice and Bob share the same signal laser, which
guarantees no mismatch in the spectrum and in the pulse
waveform. The active phase randomization is implemented to
eliminate the partial-phase-randomization attack. In our proof-
of-principle demonstration, a sawtooth wave with a repetition
rate of 55 KHz (15 KHz) is applied to the PM2 of Alice
(Bob) [37] to globally randomize the phase of each optical
pulse in the range of [0,2π ]. Alice’s and Bob’s time bins come
from the same AMZI, so they share the same phase reference
frame. For the polarization mode, the plug-and-play archi-
tecture can automatically compensate for the birefringence
effects [34].
In the asymmetric channel setting, the pulses of Alice and
Bob travel different lengths of fibers. A challenge is to match
the temporal mode. We use two additional SynLs (1310 nm) to
calibrate the arrival time. The whole system is synchronized in
the following manner: The SynL pulses are sent from Charlie
to Alice (Bob), reflected back by a Faraday mirror (1310 nm),
and detected by a PD. The output of the PD is used to drive
the signal laser (1550 nm) to generate the signal pulses of Bob
(Alice). The temporal mode difference between Alice and Bob
TABLE I. Experimental values of gains QZ(X)IAIB (×10−4). IA and
IB are the optical intensities of Alice and Bob.
Z basis X basis
μ ν ω μ ν ω
IA IB
μ 1.819 0.547 0.125 9.018 4.347 3.408
ν 0.624 0.217 0.0378 4.316 0.925 0.323
ω 0.130 0.0386 0.0050 5.207 0.323 0.0115
can be expressed as
t = (t1310CB + t1550CA
) − (t1310CA + t1550CB
)
= t0 + (1/v1550 − 1/v1310)L, (1)
where t0 = (1/v1550 − 1/v1310)(L0CB − L0CA) and L =
LCB − LCA. LC→B represents the fiber length be-
tween Charlie and Bob. L = αT L0T , where αT = 5.4 ×
10−7/◦C is the thermal expansion coefficient of the fiber and
T represents the change in temperature. The second term
in Eq. (1) is negligible since it only induces 0.14 ps with
a 10 ◦C temperature change [38]. Therefore, the arrival time
difference of signals between Alice and Bob is a constant
which can be compensated by adjusting the time delay between
two SynLs with a delay chip. The temporal mode mismatch
depends on the resolution of the delay chip (10 ps) which is
much smaller than the width of the signal pulse (2 ns). This
ensures a high-visibility interference.
III. RESULTS
In our demonstration, the optical pulses are modulated into
three different intensities according to the decoy state method
[39], namely, signal state intensity (μ = 0.4), decoy state
intensity (ν = 0.1), and vacuum state intensity (ω = 0.01).
The optical intensities of a certain basis are put into nine pairs.
The experimental gains and quantum bit error rates (QBERs)
for different intensity combinations are listed in Tables I
and II. The QBERs of the Z basis are due to the extinction ratio
of AM1 and the background counts (Rayleigh backscattering
and detectors’ dark counts). In the ideal case, the QBERs of
the Z basis should be 0. Whereas, in the X basis, the vacuum
and multiphoton components of weak coherent states cause
TABLE II. Experimental values of QBERs. Error bars represent
one standard deviation.
Z basis X basis
μ ν ω μ ν ω
IA IB
μ 0.0188 0.0378 0.136 0.269 0.341 0.483
±0.001 ±0.004 ±0.009 ±0.007 ±0.007 ±0.009
ν 0.0356 0.0450 0.133 0.351 0.278 0.428
±0.003 ±0.003 ±0.013 ±0.008 ±0.012 ±0.012
ω 0.151 0.133 0.194 0.484 0.432 0.368
±0.005 ±0.01 ±0.04 ±0.008 ±0.015 ±0.052
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FIG. 1. (a) Experimental setup of the plug-and-play MDI-QKD. The synchronization optical pulses (1310 nm) are sent out by Charlie.
They travel to Alice (Bob) and are reflected back by a Faraday mirror (1310 nm). A homemade photoelectric detector (PD) is utilized to detect
them and output the system clock. Then, the signal laser (1550 nm) generates the optical pulses of Bob (Alice). The time bins are generated by
an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (AMZI) in Charlie. The clients (Alice and Bob) receive the time-bin pulses and encode the bits.
Then, the signals are reflected back to Charlie for the partial Bell state measurement (BSM). ConSys: control system; SynL: synchronization
laser; CIR: circulator; BS: beam splitter; PC: polarization controller; WDM: wavelength division multiplexer; Attn: attenuator; FM: Faraday
mirror; SPD. (b) Schematic of the amplitude modulator (AM1): PBS: polarizing beam splitter; 45◦ PBS: polarizing beam splitter with 45◦ from
the optical axis; PM: phase modulator; FR: Faraday rotator.
accidental coincidences which introduce an error rate of 50%.
Thus, the error rate of the X basis has an expected value
of 25%.
The secure key is extracted from the data when both Alice
and Bob encode their bits using signal states (μ) in the Z basis.
The rest of the data are applied to estimate the parameters used
in the secure key rate calculation. In the asymptotic case, the
secure key rate is given by [16]
R  q
{
Q
Z,L
μμ,11
[
1 − H (eX,U11
)] − QZμμfH
(
EZμμ
)}
, (2)
where q, QZμμ, and EZμμ are the possibility, overall gain, and
QBER when Alice and Bob send the signal states in the Z
basis. QZ,Lμμ,11 = μ2e−2μYZ,L11 , where YZ,L11 is a lower bound of
the yield of single-photon states in the Z basis; eX,U11 is an upper
bound of the QBER of the single-photon states in the X basis;
Y
Z,L
11 and e
X,U
11 can be estimated from the decoy state method;
f is the error correction efficiency; H is the binary Shannon
entropy function. A total number of N = 6.14 × 1010 pulses
is sent out in the experiment. We take the values q = 118 and
f = 1.16 in our calculation. By using the analytical bounds
derived in Ref. [39], we obtain that YZ,L11 = 2.2 × 10−3 and
e
X,U
μμ,11 = 5.07% (see the Appendix). Finally, a secure key rate
of R = 4.7 × 10−6 bits per pulse is demonstrated.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
We discuss the limitations of our proof-of-principle ex-
periment and possible solutions. First, the plug-and-play
MDI-QKD is vulnerable to various source attacks [6,7,9] since
the signal source is totally controlled by an untrusted server.
By keeping a few assumptions including the single-mode
assumption, the phase-randomization assumption, and the trust
of the monitoring devices, a complete security analysis for
plug-and-play MDI-QKD was derived in Ref. [18]. It shows
that, with careful source monitoring, we can rigorously derive
a lower bound of the secure key generation rate even with
an unknown and untrusted source. According to the security
analysis in Ref. [18], the energy and arrival time of each signal
pulse should be monitored precisely to acquire the certain
information about the photon-number distribution and the
timing mode. In our demonstration, however, we cut down the
energy of signal pulses to reduce the Rayleigh backscattering,
which leads to the fact that that the intensity detector cannot
monitor such weak energy. Hence, the monitor unit was not
implemented. This can be improved by using the scheme of
pulse trains as demonstrated in conventional plug-and-play
QKDs [34,40]. Second, in our implementation, the parameters
were not optimized, and the secure key rate was only calculated
in the asymptotic case. A full parameter optimization and
the finite key effect can be considered by using the theory
in Ref. [22]. Lastly, the secure key generation rate can be
significantly improved by increasing the repetition rate and
the detector efficiency [28].
In conclusion, we have performed a proof-of-principle
demonstration of self-stabilized asymmetric plug-and-play
MDI-QKD over a 36-km fiber. The homemade laser sources
and expensive detectors are provided by a common server.
The polarization and phase can be automatically calibrated
and stabilized. The passive time-calibration technique ensures
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a precise and stable interference of photons from two remote
parties. The techniques demonstrated in our experiment greatly
improve the practicability of MDI-QKD and pave the way for
a MDI quantum network with an untrusted network server.
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APPENDIX: SECURE KEY RATE ESTIMATION
The secure key rate is calculated with an analytical method
with two decoy states according to Ref. [39]. YZ,L11 is given
by
Y
Z,L
11 =
(
μ2a − ω2a
)(μb − ωb)QM1Z −
(
ν2a − ω2a
)(νb − ωb)QM2Z
(μa − ωa)(μb − ωb)(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)(μa − νa) ,
(A1)
where QM1Z = QνaνbZ e(νa+νb) + QωaωbZ e(ωa+ωb) − QνaωbZ e(νa+ωb)− QωaνbZ e(ωa+νb), QM2Z = QμaμbZ e(μa+μb) + QωaωbZ e(ωa+ωb) −
Q
μaωb
Z e
(μa+ωb) − QωaμbZ e(ωa+μb).
TABLE III. Parameters estimated in the process of
secure key rate estimation. QM1(2)λ (10−4), Y λ,L11 (10−3)
with λ ∈ {X,Z}.
QM1λ Q
M2
λ Y
λ,L
11
Z 0.1846 3.668 2.219
X 0.4353 10.016 4.40
e
X,U
11 is
e
X,U
11 =
1
(νa − ωa)(νb − ωb)YX,L11
× [QνaνbX EνaνbX e(νa+νb) + QωaωbX EωaωbX e(ωa+ωb)
−QνaωbX EνaωbX e(νa+ωb) − QωaνbX EωaνbX e(ωa+νb)
]
,
(A2)
where YX,L11 can be achieved with a similar method to Y
Z,L
11 .
By using the above equations, we estimate the parameters
listed in Table III. In the secure key calculation, we assume
an error correction code with f = 1.16 and choose q = 118 ,
which is due to the fact that the three optical intensity states
are prepared with the same probability.
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